We systematize software side-channel attacks with a focus on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in the cryptographic implementations. Particularly, we survey past research literature to categorize vulnerable implementations, and identify common strategies to eliminate them. We then evaluate popular libraries and applications, quantitatively measuring and comparing the vulnerability severity, response time and coverage. Based on these characterizations and evaluations, we offer some insights for side-channel researchers, cryptographic software developers and users. We hope our study can inspire the side-channel research community to discover new vulnerabilities, and more importantly, to fortify applications against them.
Introduction
Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to computer applications and systems. They exploit the vulnerabilities in the implementations instead of the algorithms. Vulnerable implementations can exhibit inputdependent non-functional behaviors at runtime, which can be observed by an adversary to fully or partially recover the sensitive input. Over the past few years, numerous side-channel vulnerabilities were discovered and exploited to defeat modern cryptographic schemes, allowing adversaries to break strong ciphers in a short period of time with very few trials.
Defeating side-channel vulnerabilities has been a longstanding goal for providing robust cryptographic protection. Although security-aware systems [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] and architectures [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] were designed to mitigate side-channel attacks, a more efficient and practical approach is to eliminate side-channel sources from software implementations. Various tools and methods were proposed to facilitate creating software free of side channels [12, 13] or verifying their non-existence [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . It is however still very challenging to remove all side-channel vulnerabilities from critical implementations, since cryptographic applications usually have a large code base and high performance requirement. As such, the arms race between side-channel attacks and defenses remains heated.
Past several decades have seen a large amount of literature about side-channel vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, various open-source libraries and commercial products have introduced different mitigation solutions. Thus, it becomes necessary to systematize the knowledge about the characteristics and evolution of these vulnerabilities and countermeasures. We are particularly interested in three questions: (1) What are the common and distinct features of various vulnerabilities? (2) What are common mitigation strategies? (3) What is the status quo of cryptographic applications regarding side-channel vulnerabilities? Past work only surveyed attack techniques and media [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] , without offering unified summaries for software vulnerabilities and countermeasures that are more useful.
This paper provides a comprehensive characterization of side-channel vulnerabilities and countermeasures, as well as evaluations of cryptographic applications related to side-channel attacks. We present this study in three directions. (1) Systematization of literature: we characterize the vulnerabilities from past work with regard to the implementations; for each vulnerability, we describe the root cause and the technique required to launch a successful attack. (2) Identification and abstraction of key countermeasure techniques: we summarize the common strategies to mitigate different categories of vulnerabilities; we also explore and compare the effectiveness of each countermeasure implementation under different threat models. (3) Evaluation of cryptographic applications: we perform a timeline analysis of side-channel vulnerabilities and the corresponding patches in various libraries and products, and evaluate the vulnerability severity, patch release speed and coverage from a practical perspective.
Scope. There are generally two types of side-channel attacks. In software attacks, an adversary interacts with the victim application through a local malicious program or over the network to collect information such as execution time [32, 33] and memory access pattern [34] for recovering the victim's secrets. Such vulnerabilities are usually caused by critical control flow or data flow leakage. In physical attacks, an adversary physically interferes with the victim's execution (e.g., fault injection [35] ) or approaches the victim to collect physical signals such as acoustic emission [36] , electromagnetic radiation [37, 38] and power trace [39, 40] . The adversary utilizes special analysis (e.g., power analysis [41, 42] ) to obtain finer grained information (e.g., intermediate values, Hamming weights) than control flow or data flow. In this paper, we mainly focus on software attacks, which are more exploitable and common. Physical attacks and vulnerabilities are out of the scope of this paper.
Contributions. The main purpose of this work is to help researchers, software developers and users better understand the status quo and future direction of side-channel research and countermeasure development. Based on our systematization, we: 1) propose three possible directions arXiv:1911.09312v2 [cs.CR] 12 Dec 2019 for researchers to consider in their future exploration; 2) provide three recommendations for developers to follow in security enhancement of their applications against sidechannel attacks; 3) identify three indications for users to utilize in selecting libraries and implementations most suitable for their usage scenarios. The key contributions of this paper are: • Characterization of side-channel vulnerabilities in implementations of cryptographic operations (Sec. 3). • Identification and dissection of common countermeasure technique designs (Sec. 4). • Evaluation of cryptographic applications, and analysis of vulnerabilities and countermeasures (Sec. 5). • Insights and recommendations for side-channel researchers, software developers and users (Sec. 6).
Background
2.1. Basics of Cryptography 2.1.1. Asymmetric Cryptography. Each user has a public key that is widely distributed and a private key that is kept to herself. This pair of keys can be used for data encryption/decryption and digital signature. RSA [43] . Two different large prime numbers, p and q, and an integer e, are chosen to satisfy that gcd(p−1, e) = 1 and gcd(q − 1, e) = 1. Let N = pq and d = e −1 mod (p−1)(q−1), then the public key is the tuple (N, e), and the private key is d. For a message m, the ciphertext is calculated as c ≡ m e mod N . For a ciphertext c, the message is decrypted as m ≡ c d mod N . The security of RSA relies on the difficulty of factoring large integers. ElGamal [44] . A large cyclic group G is chosen. Let q be its order, g be its generator, x be a random positive integer smaller than q, and h = g x , then the public key is the tuple (G, q, g, h), and the private key is x. To encrypt a message m, one chooses a random positive integer smaller than q, denoted by y, and calculate the ciphertext as (g y , m · h y ).
To decrypt a ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ), one can compute m = c 2 ·(c x 1 ) −1 . The security of ElGamal relies on the difficulty of solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [45, 46] . An elliptic curve group is chosen with prime order p and generator G. Let k be a random positive integer smaller than p, then k is the private key, and the public key is D = kG. To encrypt a message m, one encodes m to a point M on the curve, chooses a random positive integer r, and calculate the ciphertext as two points (M + rD, rG). To decrypt a ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ), one can compute M = C 1 kC 2 , and decode point M to message m. The security of ECC relies on the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. Appendix A.1 has more details.
Symmetric Cryptography.
A single key is used in both data encryption and decryption, and is shared between two users. Digital signature cannot supported. AES-128. During key setup, a 16-byte secret key k = (k 0 , ..., k 15 ) is expanded into 11 round keys while the initial round key is just the original key itself. Given a 16-byte plaintext p = (p 0 , ..., p 15 ), encryption proceeds by computing a 16-byte intermediate state 15 ) at each round r as a 4 × 4 matrix. The initial state is computed as x (0) i = p i ⊕ k i (i = 0, ..., 15), known as AddRoundKey. Each of the following 9 rounds consists of SubBytes (byte substitution based  on a lookup table) , ShiftRows (transposition of bytes within each of the three last rows in the 4 × 4 matrix), MixColumns (matrix multiplication to make each byte represents a weighted sum of all bytes in its column) and AddRoundKey operations. The final round has only SubBytes, ShiftRow and AddRoundKey operations, and its output is the ciphertext.
2.1.3. Post-Quantum Cryptography. This cipher family was proposed to sustain attacks by a quantum computer. One popular scheme is lattice-based cryptography. NTRU [47] . It utilizes simple polynomial multiplication in the ring of truncated polynomials Z q [X]/(X N − 1). For encryption, the private key consists of a pair of polynomials f and g, and the public key
To encrypt a message m, one needs to compute a hash function r = G(m) and m = m ⊕ H(r · h mod q). Then the ciphertext is e = (r · h + m ) mod q. To decrypt the message, one needs to first recover m = ((f · e mod q) mod p) · f −1 p mod p and then the plaintext is computed as M = m ⊕ H(e − m mod q). The security of NTRU relies on the difficulty of solving the shortest vector problem in a lattice. Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) [48] . To generate a key pair, one needs to create a polynomial a ∈ R with coefficients chosen uniformly in Z q , sample two polynomials r 1 , r 2 ∈ R q from χ and compute p = r 1 −a·r 2 ∈ R q . Then the public key is (a, p) and the private key is r 2 . To encrypt a message m, one needs to first encode m to a polynomial m, and sample three polynomials e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ∈ R q from χ. Then the ciphertext is (c 1 , c 2 ), where c 1 = a · e 1 + e 2 and c 2 = p · e 1 + e 3 + m. To decrypt the message, one needs to compute m = c 1 ·r 2 +c 2 ∈ R q and decode the coefficients of m to either 0 or 1. Bimodal Lattice Signature Scheme (BLISS) [49] . The private key is S = (s 1 , s 2 ) where s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z q [X]/(X N − 1) and the corresponding public key is A = (2a q , q − 2) mod 2q where a q = s 2 /s 1 . To sign a message µ, two blinding values y 1 , y 2 ∈ R are sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution. A hash value is computed as c = H( u d mod p, µ), where u = ζ · 2a q y 1 + y 2 mod 2q, and ζ = (1/(q − 2)) mod 2q. The signature is then the
(a) Control flow vulnerability
Pre-compute: Fig. 1 : Side-channel vulnerabilities decrypts the ciphertext, she accepts this message only when the first two bytes are 0x00 and 0x02, and next 8 bytes are non-zero. Then she searches for 0x00 in the remaining data, and everything after that will be the key. Hash and encryption. After the key is established, standard network protocols adopt CBC-MAC to encrypt messages. (1) Message Authentication Code (MAC) is calculated over the sequence number SEQ, header HDR and message m. (2) The plaintext P is created by concatenating m, the MAC from step (1), and a padding string pad, which is chosen to make the byte length of P a multiple of the block size b. (3) P is divided into blocks of b bytes, each block encrypted with key K. (4) The final message is the concatenation of HDR and all encrypted blocks. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext in CBC mode and validates the padding format and the MAC. If both are correct, she accepts the original intact message m.
Basics of Side-channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks enable adversaries to steal secrets by exploiting observable information from the application's execution. When the application takes a secret input X , the host system or application shows a runtime characteristic Y, which can be captured by an adversary. By identifying the correlation Y ∼ X , the adversary is able to infer the secret input via the side-channel information.
2.2.1.
Vulnerabilities. The root cause of side-channel attacks is that application's runtime behavior depends on the secrets. Generally there are two types of leakage sources: Secret-dependent control flow. When the secret s is different, the program executes a different code path and invokes a different function ( Figure 1a ). This yields different runtime behaviors distinguishable by the adversary. Secret-dependent data flow. A program may access data whose locations are determined by the secret s ( Figure  1b ). The memory access pattern allows the adversary to make educated guesses about the secret value.
Techniques.
Another key factor for a successful side-channel attack is the technique to capture useful characteristics of the application or the system. We consider two types of software-based techniques and approaches. Network-level attacks. The remote adversary connects to the victim application via networks. Thus, side-channel information may exist in the responses from the victim such as message content [50, 51] , packet size [52] and response time [53, 54] . Host-level attacks. The malicious program and the victim application run on the same platform, and thus share the same micro-architectural units. Contention on these units can disclose the victim's runtime behaviors to the adversary. Researchers have designed a large quantity of attack techniques based on various hardware units including CPU cache [34, 55] , branch predictor [56] and TLB [57] .
Characterization of Vulnerabilities
We systematically characterize side-channel vulnerabilities from past work based on different operations in different cryptographic ciphers and protocols. Table 1 summarizes the vulnerabilities we will describe. For each vulnerability, we present the vulnerable operations, causes and the corresponding attacks (types, techniques, sidechannel information granularities).
Asymmetric Cryptography
3.1.1. Modular Multiplication. Given three integers x, y and m, this operation is to calculate x * y mod m. Naive and Karatsuba multiplications. Both OpenSSL and GnuPG implement two multiplication routines: naive multiplication and Karatsuba multiplication [105] . The routine is selected based on the size of the operands: the naive routine is adopted for multiplicands of small sizes, while Karatsuba routine is adopted for large multiplicands.
Such implementation introduces control-flow side channels about the operands: Karatsuba routine is typically faster than the native routine. An adversary can measure the execution time to infer the sizes of the operands, and then recover the secret key [58] .
Modular Exponentiation/Scalar Multiplication.
We consider the two operations together as they share similar implementations and vulnerabilities. Modular exponentiation is to calculate x y mod m, where x, y and m are three integers. Scalar multiplication is to calculate yx where y is a scalar and x is a point on the elliptic curve. The implementations of these two operations can reveal the secret key y in RSA and ElGamal, or secret scalar y in ECC via side channels. Square-and-Multiply/Double-and-Add [106, 107] . The calculation of modular exponentiation is converted into a sequence of SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations. The binary representation of y is denoted as y n−1 y n−2 ...y 0 . Then starting from n − 1 to 0, for each bit y i , SQUARE is called. If y i is 1, MULTIPLY is also called. Similarly, scalar multiplication is converted into a sequence of PointDouble and PointAdd based on each bit y i . Such implementations are vulnerable to control-flow side-channel attacks: the execution of MULTIPLY or PointAdd depends on bit y i . By observing the traces of SQUARE and MULTIPLY in modular exponentiation, or PointDouble and PointAdd in scalar multiplication, an adversary can fully recover y. Successful attacks have been demonstrated against RSA in GnuPG via cache PRIME-PROBE [60, 61] and FLUSH-RELOAD [59] techniques, and against EdDSA via TLB side-channel [57] . Square-and-Multiply-always/Double-and-Add-always [107] . For modular exponentiation, this implementation always executes both SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations for each bit. It selects the output of SQUARE if y i is 0, and the output of MULTIPLY following SQUARE if y i is This implementation executes a fixed number of SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations for modular exponentiation, or PointDouble and PointAdd operations for scalar multiplication, defeating remote timing attacks. However output selection still requires a secret-dependent branch, which is usually smaller than one cache line. If it fits within the same cache line with preceding and succeeding code, then it is not vulnerable to host-level attacks. However, Doychev and Köpf [62] showed that for Libgcrypt, some compiler options can put this branch into separate cache lines, making this implementation vulnerable to cache-based attacks. Gras et al. [57] showed that this branch can put into separate pages, and the implementation is subject to TLB-based attacks. Sliding window [108] . For modular exponentiation, the exponent y is represented as a sequence of windows d i . Each window starts and ends with bit 1, and the window length cannot exceed a fixed parameter w. So the value of any window is an odd number between 1 and 2 w − 1. This method pre-computes x v mod m for each odd value v ∈ [1, 2 w − 1], and stores these results in a table indexed by i ∈ [0, (v − 1)/2]. Then it scans every window, squares and multiplies the corresponding entry in the table.
Similarly, for scalar multiplication, the scalar y is represented as a w-ary non-adjacent form (wNAF), with each window value d i ∈ {0, ±1, ..., ±(2 w−1 − 1)}. It first pre-computes the values of {1, 3, ..., 2 w−1 − 1}x, and stores them into a table. Then it scans each window, doubles and
Two types of vulnerabilities exist in such implementations. The first one is secret-dependent control flow: different routines will be called depending on whether a window is zero. By monitoring the execution trace of those branches, the adversary learns if each window is zero, and further recovers the secret. Such attacks have been realized against RSA [55, 63] and ECDSA [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] .
The second one is secret-dependent data flow: the access location in the pre-computed table is determined by each window value. By observing the access pattern, the adversary is able to recover each window value. Attacks exploiting this vulnerability have been mounted against RSA [69] , ElGamal [61] and ECDSA [70] . Fixed window [109] . This method was designed to approach true constant-time implementation. Similar to sliding window, it also divides the secret y into a set of windows, pre-computes the exponentiation or multiplication of each window value, and stores the results in a table. The differences are that the window size is fixed as w, and the table stores both odd and even (including zero) values. It removes the critical control flow branch at the cost of more memory and slower run time.
To remove critical data flow, this approach can be combined with scatter-gather memory layout technique [110] , which stores the pre-computed values in different cache lines instead of consecutive memory locations. Specifically, each window value is stored across multiple cache lines, and each cache line stores parts of multiple window values. When MULTIPLY or PointAdd is executed, multiple cache lines are fetched to reconstruct the window value, hiding the access pattern from the adversary.
This implementation is still vulnerable to attacks [71] using cache bank, the minimal data access unit in caches. Concurrent requests can be served in parallel if they target different cache banks even in the same cache line, but have to be served sequentially if they target the same cache bank. The timing difference between the two cases enables the adversary to infer the window values accessed during the gathering phase, and then recover the secret bits. Masked window. This approach was derived from fixed window implementation to further hide the cache bank access patterns. The idea is to access all window values instead of just the one needed, and then use a mask to filter out unused data. It performs a constant sequence of memory accesses, and has been proven secure against different types of cache-based attacks [62] . Montgomery ladder [111, 112] . This is a variation of Double-and-Add-always for scalar multiplication. It also represents y in the binary form and conducts both PointAdd and PointDouble functions for each bit, irrespective of the bit value. The outputs of these functions are assigned to the intermediate variables determined by the bit value. A difference from Double-and-Addalways is that in Montgomery ladder, the parameter of PointDouble is also determined by the bit value.
This implementation contains branches depending on the secret values. Yarom and Benger [72] adopted cache FLUSH-RELOAD technique to identify the branch patterns and attack ECDSA in OpenSSL. Brumley and Tuveri [73] discovered that the implementation in OpenSSL 0.9.8 loops from the most significant non-zero bit in y to 0. So the number of iterations is proportional to log(y). This presents a vulnerability for remote timing attacks. Branchless Montgomery ladder [113] . This approach replaces branches in Montgomery ladder with a function that uses bitwise logic to swap two intermediate values only if the bit is 1, and thus removes the timing channel. However, the implementations of PointAdd and PointDouble can still bring side channels.
First, OpenSSL adopts a lookup table to accelerate the square operation in the two functions. The access pattern to the table can leak information about the secret in ECDH [74] . Second, the modulo operation of x mod m in the two functions adopted the early exit implementation: if x is smaller than m, x is directly returned. This branch can be exploited by the adversary to check whether x is smaller than m, and then deduce secrets in EDH [75] . Third, Kaufmann et al. [76] discovered that in Windows OS, the multiplication function of two 64-bit integers has an operand-dependent branch: if both operands have their 32 least significant bits equal to 0, then the multiplication is skipped and the result will be 0. This early exit branch was exploited to attack ECDH.
Modular Inverse.
This operation is to calculate the integer x −1 m such that xx −1 m ≡ 1 mod m. It can also be used to check if two integers, p and q, are co-prime.
Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm [109] . This approach uses arithmetic shift, comparison and subtraction to replace division. It is particularly efficient for big integers, but suffers from control flow vulnerabilities due to the introduction of operand-dependent branches. Branch prediction [56] attacks was demonstrated to recover the value of m in ECDSA and RSA. Page fault [77] and cache FLUSH-RELOAD [78] techniques were adopted to attack the gcd operation in RSA key generation. Euclidean Extended Algorithm. This approach calculates quotients and remainders in each step without introducing secret-dependent branches. It is less efficient but secure against control flow side-channel attacks.
Symmetric Cryptography
In addition to asymmetric ciphers, symmetric ciphers, e.g., AES, can also be vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
Substitution-Permutation
. This is a series of linked mathematical operations used in block ciphers. It takes a block of the plaintext and the key as inputs, and applies several alternating "rounds" of substitution boxes and permutation boxes to produce the ciphertext block. For AES, it consists of four basic operations: ShiftRows, MixColumns, SubBytes and AddRoundKey. T-box lookup. This approach converts the algebraic operations in each round into lookup table accesses. For AES, there are 8 pre-computed tables: T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 are used in the first 9 rounds and T 10 1 , T 10 2 , T 10 3 , T 10 0 are used in the final round. Each table contains 256 4-byte words. Then each round can be computed by updating the intermediate states with certain words from the corresponding tables.
Since the accessed entries of the lookup tables are determined by the secret keys and plaintexts, an adversary can capture such access patterns to infer secrets. Local cache attacks were proposed using PRIME-PROBE [34] , EVICT-TIME [34] and FLUSH-RELOAD [79, 80] techniques. Remote timing attacks were proposed [32, 33] due to cache access collisions.
Post-Quantum Cryptography
Although post-quantum cryptography is secure against quantum computer based attacks, the implementations of those algorithms can contain side-channel vulnerabilities, which can be attacked even by a conventional computer.
Distribution Sampling.
This operation is to sample an integer from a distribution. It is essential for BLISS [49] to make the signature statistically independent of the secrets. However, an adversary can adopt side-channel attacks to recover the sampled data, and hence the secrets. Cumulative Distribution Table ( CDT) Sampling [114] . BLISS needs to sample blinding values from a discrete Gaussian distribution, and add them to the signature. The CDT sampling approach pre-computes a table
At the sampling phase, a random number r is uniformly chosen from [0, 1), and the target
Some implementations adopt a guide table I to restrict the search space and accelerate the search process.
The access pattern to the two tables reveals information about the sampled values. An adversary can adopt cache FLUSH-RELOAD technique to recover the blinding values, and further the secret key in BLISS [81, 82] . Rejection Sampling [115] . This approach samples a bit from a Bernoulli distribution B(exp(−x/2σ 2 )). The implementation can bring side-channel opportunities for stealing the secret x: (1) a lookup table ET[i] = exp(−2 i /(2σ 2 )) is pre-computed to accelerate the bit sampling, causing a data flow vulnerability; (2) the sampling process needs to iterate over each secret bit and different branches will be executed for different bit values, producing a control flow vulnerability.
Practical attacks were demonstrated exploiting those vulnerabilities. First, rejection sampling can replace CDT sampling for blinding value generation. An adversary could utilize cache [81, 82] or branch [83] based attacks to recover the sampled values in BLISS. Second, this approach can also be used to sample random bits to probabilistically determine whether the blinding value is positive or negative, and whether the signature should be accepted or rejected. An adversary can infer the secret from this process via cache or branch traces [83, 84] .
Failure Rate Reduction.
Post-quantum schemes may have certain failure rate during encryption or decryption due to its statistic nature. Thus it is necessary to devise methods to reduce the possibililty of failure. Error Correcting Code (ECC). This approach can significantly reduce the failure rate, but its implementation can reveal whether the ciphertext contains an error via timing channels: a ciphertext without an error is much faster to decode than one with errors. An adversary can exploit such information to recover the key [85] .
3.3.3. Message Randomization. Some post-quantum schemes require to randomize the message during encryption and decryption. This process can also create sidechannel vulnerabilities. Padding-Hash. In NTRU, encryption and decryption utilize hash functions to randomize the messages. However, the number of hash function calls highly depends on the input message. Thus, the total execution time of encryption or decryption will also differ for different inputs. By measuring such time information, an adversary is able to recover the secret input [86] .
Cryptographic Protocol
Side-channel attacks were proposed to target the cryptographic protocols, specifically, the padding mechanism.
3.4.1. RSA-PAD. As introduced in Sec. 2.1.4, network protocols usually adopt RSA with PKCS. The padding mechanism can leak information about the plaintexts. Error message. In the handshake protocol in SSL 3.0, the receiver decrypts the message, and checks whether it is PKCS conforming. If so, she continues the handshake protocol. Otherwise she sends an error message back to the sender and aborts the connection. This message serves as a side channel to recover the plaintext. When the sender sends out a ciphertext, the adversary can intercept the message and send a modified one to the receiver. From the receiver's response, the adversary learns if the first two bytes of the plaintext corresponding to the modified ciphertext are 0x00||0x02 (valid PKCS conforming) or not (invalid PKCS conforming). This can reduce the scope of the original plaintext. The adversary can repeat this process until the scope of plaintext is narrowed down to one single value.
This vulnerability was discovered by Bleichenbacher [50] , followed by variants of such attacks [87, 88] . Largescale evaluations showed that it still exists in many realworld websites, applications [89] and protocols [90] . Uniform response message. A common defense is to unify the responses for valid and invalid paddings: if the decrypted message structure is not PKCS conforming, the receiver generates a random string as the plaintext, and performs all subsequent handshake computations on it. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish valid ciphertexts from invalid ones based on the responses.
This implementation can still incur side-channel vulnerabilities. First, there can be other types of messages that reveal the validation of padding format. For instance, in XML encryption, the message is encrypted using CBC mode, and the symmetric key is encrypted using RSA. Jager et al. [94] discovered that the response of CBC encryption can leak whether the RSA padding is correct, enabling the adversary to recover the symmetric key.
Second, there can be observable timing differences between valid and invalid padding cases. Meyer et al. [53] discovered that in OpenSSL and JSSE, the receiver needs more time to process the ill formatted message, due to generation of random numbers. Jager et al. [94] found that in XML encryption, invalid CBC decryption following valid RSA decryption takes longer time than invalid RSA decryption.
Third, there can be control flow branches that depend on whether the message is PKCS conforming, such as error logging, data conversion and padding verification. They enable a host-based adversary to monitor the execution trace as the oracle. Attacks based on controlflow inference and cache FLUSH-RELOAD techniques [92, 93, 95] were designed against different applications.
CBC-MAC-PAD.
The CBC-MAC padding scheme (Sec. 2.1.4) can also incur side-channel vulnerabilities. Error message. When the receiver gets the ciphertext in CBC-MAC mode, she decrypts it and validates the padding format. (1) If the format is invalid, she rejects the message, and sends a decryption failed error message to the sender. Otherwise, she checks the MAC value. (2) If the MAC is incorrect, she returns a bad record mac error message. (3) Otherwise, the message passes the validation and is accepted by the receiver. These three conditions with three different responses create a side channel: an adversary can modify the ciphertext and send it to the receiver for decryption. Based on the response, he can learn whether the chosen ciphertext is decrypted into an incorrect padding. This oracle enables the adversary to learn each byte of an arbitrary plaintext block.
This vulnerability was first discovered by Vaudenay [51] . Möller et al. [96] designed an variant attack, POO-DLE, to compromise SSL 3.0. Evaluations on different applications [99, 100] and protocols [97, 98] were conducted to show its severity and pervasiveness. Uniform response message [116] . This solution unifies the responses for both invalid padding format error and invalid MAC error, so the adversary cannot know whether the decrypted ciphertext has a valid padding or not.
Timing channels exist in this approach: if the format is invalid, the receiver only needs to perform simple operations on the very end of the ciphertext; otherwise, she needs to further perform MAC validation throughout the whole ciphertext, which takes more time. Attacks exploiting such timing discrepancy between these two cases were demonstrated against TLS protocol in stunnel [101] , and DTLS in OpenSSL and GnuTLS [54] . Dummy MAC checking. This approach attempts to remove the timing channel by calling a dummy MAC validation even when the padding is incorrect. However, the calculation of MAC over a message M depends on the message length: it takes more time to compress longer M . Dummy MAC assumes the plaintext contains no padding, i.e., longest M . So an adversary can choose the ciphertext with short length of M to distinguish whether a real or dummy MAC is performed. AlFardan and Paterson [102] proposed lucky thirteen attacks, exploiting this vulnerability to recover plaintexts in TLS. Constant-time compression. Different strategies were designed to achieve constant-time compression implementations: (1) dummy data can be appended to the padding for a maximum (i.e., constant) number of MAC compression operations; (2) extra dummy compression operations can be added to make MAC validation constant time.
These implementations still contain secret-dependent control flows, making them vulnerable to host-level attacks. An adversary can obtain the padding validation results via cache FLUSH-RELOAD [103] , PRIME-PROBE [104] or control-flow inference [92] techniques.
Summary of Countermeasures
In this section, we summarize the cryptographic implementations from the perspective of side-channel defenses.
From Sec. 3 we observe that one implementation may be secure against one type of attack, but possibly vulnerable to another type of attack. The side-channel resistance of one implementation highly depends on the adversarial capabilities, i.e., type and granularity of observable sidechannel information. Table 2 summarizes the effectiveness of different countermeasure implementations under different types of attacks, which serves as a reference for developers and users to select the optimal implementation based on their security demands and threat models.
The goal of side-channel defenses is to eliminate the correlation between the application's secrets and runtime behaviors. This can be achieved by either unifying or randomizing the side-channel information. Different approaches may share common routines and features. Below we abstract the key features of these techniques. 
Side-channel Information
r1 ← foo() r2 ← bar() if s = 1 then r ← r1 else r ← r2 return r (a) AlwaysExecute-ConditionalSelect r1 ← foo() r2 ← bar() r ← (r1 & s) | (r2 & !s) return r (b) AlwaysExecute-BitwiseSelect
Fig. 2: Remove control flow vulnerability
Pre-compute: (Figure 1a ). Two strategies can be used to remove such control flow. AlwaysExecute-ConditionalSelect. Each possible routine is always executed regardless of the condition. Based on the secret value, the correct result is assigned to the return variable (Figure 2a ). This technique is adopted in modular exponentiation (Square-and-Multiply-always), scalar multiplication (Double-and-Add-always) and CBC-MAC-PAD (dummy MAC checking).
This solution is effective against network-level attacks. However, control flow in result selection can still be observed by an adversary via host-level attacks. Besides, if the values of each code path are pre-computed and stored in memory, the adversary can also infer the secret via data flow, exemplified by sliding window implementations in modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication. AlwaysExecute-BitwiseSelect. This strategy performs all possible computations, and then selects the correct result using bitwise operations of secret s (Figure 2b ). This introduces no branches or access patterns. The branchless Montgomery ladder algorithm adopts this solution for constant-time conditional swap in scalar multiplication.
Remove Data Flow.
Data flow vulnerabilities exist when different values of the secret s cause different memory accesses that can be observed by the adversary (Figure 1b ). Two strategies can remove such data flow. AlwaysAccess-BitwiseSelect. This method accesses all critical locations, and selects the correct value based on the bitwise operation (Figure 3a ). It is adopted in masked window modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication. On-the-fly calculation. We can calculate the value every time it is used instead of pre-computing all values and storing them into a table, particularly when the calculation is not complex and does not introduce secret-dependent control flows. Branchless Montgomery ladder adopts this method in the square operation of scalar multiplication. proves the high-level asymmetric cipher algorithms. There are generally two types of blinding techniques. Key blinding. A random factor is blended into the secret key, but the original key and the randomized key generate the same cryptographic result. The adversary can only obtain the randomized key via side-channel attacks, which is useless without knowing the blended random factor. For ECDSA and ECDH, the randomized key is k + sr where r is a random number and s is the group order. The scalar multiplication generates (k + sr)G, the same as kG [39] . For RSA and ElGamal, the randomized key is d+rφ(n) where r is a random number and φ is the Euler's totient function. The decryption gives c d+rφ(n) mod n, the same as c d mod n. In both cases, the true value of k is hidden from side-channel adversaries. Plaintext/ciphertext blinding. This approach randomizes the plaintexts or ciphertexts, adaptively chosen by the adversary. The randomized texts cause the adversary to recover a wrong key via side-channel analysis. This solution works only if correct ciphertexts can be produced from randomized plaintexts and vice versa.
Side-channel Information
For ECDSA and ECDH, we can choose a random point R and use G = G + R in computation. The adversary cannot recover k from the side-channel observation without the knowledge of R [39] , but we can easily reproduce the correct result kG by subtracting kR from kG . For RSA and ElGamal, we can generate a random value r, and replace c with c * r e . Now the decryption process is randomized to be (c * r e ) d mod n = c d * r ed mod n. To get c d mod n we can simply multiply the result by r −1 , as r ed * r −1 ≡ 1 mod n.
Evaluation of Cryptographic Libraries
From a practical perspective, we review, analyze and evaluate the development of side-channel attacks and defenses in two commonly used cryptographic libraries: OpenSSL and GNU Crypto (GnuPG, Libgcrypt and GnuTLS). We collect side-channel related history (1999 -2019) from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), changelogs and commit messages, and source code. Table 3 shows the evolution of the libraries. The full history is tabulated in Appendix D.
Vulnerability severity
We examine the severity and practicality of sidechannel attacks as well as the attention developers paid to them. We establish the measurements for these threats and compare them with other vulnerability categories.
We adopt the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 1 , an industry standard, to assess each CVE. The score ranges from 0 (least severe) to 10 (most severe). We consider the Base score that well represents the inherent quality of a vulnerability. It comprises two subscores, Exploitability that defines the difficulty to attack the software and Impact that defines the level of damage to certain properties of the software under a successful attack. Appendix C details computation of these scores.
For OpenSSL and GNU Crypto, the top vulnerabilities are denial-of-service, arbitrary code execution, buffer overflow, and memory corruption. Figure 4 compares the average scores and quantities of these vulnerability categories 2 . We observe that side-channel vulnerabilities are regarded less severe than other types due to lower Exploitability and Impact sub-scores. Side-channel attacks usually require stronger adversarial capabilities, indepth knowledge about underlying platforms, and a large amount of attack sessions, but only cause partial confidentiality breach as they leak (part of) keys or plaintexts. In contrast, other vulnerabilities may be exploited by lessexperienced attackers, but enable them to execute arbitrary code or disable the services entirely.
Next we compare side-channel vulnerabilities in two categories: asymmetric ciphers and protocol padding (we skip symmetric ciphers and post-quantum cryptography as fewer vulnerabilities were identified in their libraries). Figure 5a shows the average CVSS scores of each category. We observe that vulnerabilities in protocol padding are generally more severe that those in asymmetric ciphers 1. The latest CVSS version is v3.0. In this paper, we adopt CVSS v2.0, as old vulnerabilities were not assigned CVSS v3.0 scores.
2. There are some mistakes in CVEs: (1) all side-channel vulnerabilities should only have partial confidentiality impact, while CVE-2003-0131, CVE-2013-1619 and CVE-2018-16868 were also assigned partial integrity or availability impact. (2) CVE-2018-10844, CVE-2018-10845 and CVE-2018-10846 should have local access vector, but they were assigned network access vector. We corrected them in our analysis. due to higher Exploitability. The underlying reason is that Exploitability is determined by access vector and access complexity (Appendix C). Figure 5b shows the breakdown of these two factors in each category. For plexity, medium access complexity is a majority for both categories, and the difference between them is not large enough to significantly affect the score.
Vulnerability Response
We evaluate the responses to discovered side-channel vulnerabilities from the cryptographic library developers. Response speed. For each vulnerability, we measure the vulnerability window, defined as the duration from the vulnerability publication date 3 to the patch release date. If the patch release date is earlier than the vulnerability publication date, the vulnerability window is negative. Obviously narrower vulnerability window leads to fewer chances of exploit and less damage. Figure 6a shows the cumulative distribution of vulnerability windows for OpenSSL and GNU Crypto. We can see that both libraries responded to side-channel vulnerabilities very actively: 56% and 50% of vulnerabilities were fixed by the two libraries respectively before publication; more than 80% of vulnerabilities were fixed within one month of their disclosure; each library has only one case that spanned more than 4 months, the longest duration being 198 days in GnuPG. Figure 6b compares the vulnerability windows of different access vectors. Although network attacks are more severe than local attacks, they were fixed at similar speeds. Response coverage. We found that most discovered vulnerabilities were addressed in OpenSSL and GNU Crypto, except that host-based padding oracle vulnerabilities [92, 104] still exist in both libraries at the time of writing. One possible reason is that such host attacks require stronger adversarial capabilities and can only work in limited contexts, and thus are less severe.
Cross-branch Patch Consistency
An application usually maintains different development branches concurrently. When a vulnerability is discovered, if the corresponding patch is not applied to all live branches at the same time, then an adversary gets an chance to attack the unpatched branches. For instance, OpenSSL replaced the vulnerable sliding window scalar multiplication with branchless Montgomery ladder in version 1.1.0i on August 14, 2018, but not in the 1.0.2 branch. This left a chance for port-based attacks [68] to work on the sliding window implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.2, 3 . A side-channel vulnerability may be published in different ways, including online archives, security conferences and journals, and the CVE system. We use the earliest of all such dates. For each vulnerability, we measure the cross-branch vulnerability window, defined as the duration from the first patch release date to the date when all live branches are patched. Figure 7 shows the number of patches in different vulnerability windows for both libraries. In most cases, a patch was applied to all live branches at the same time (0 days). Some patches are however still missing in certain branches at the time of writing (unpatch). For example, OpenSSL 1.0.1 introduced masked-window multiplication and AES-NI support that were never ported to 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 branches before their end of life. OpenSSL 1.0.2r includes a bug fix for protocol error handling, but it is not applied to 1.1.0 and 1. 
Countermeasure Type
We study the types of countermeasures commonly adopted by cryptographic libraries to fix side-channel vulnerabilities. Four categories are considered: (1) introducing brand new implementations; (2) selecting existing secure implementations; (3) fixing software bugs; (4) enhancing robustness of existing implementations. Classification of countermeasures for OpenSSL and GNU Crypto is shown in Figure 8 .
In the earlier days, OpenSSL mainly introduced new implementations to fix side-channel vulnerabilities. After many years' evolution, each cryptographic operation has secure implementations, and brand new solutions become unnecessary. Recent patches were often minor bug fixes. Besides, previously developers only patched the code upon revelation of new issues. Now they proactively fortify the library without the evidence of potential vulnerabilities. This definitely improves the security of the library against side-channel attacks.
GNU Crypto has fewer vulnerabilities and patches compared to OpenSSL, and prefers using traditional solutions for some common issues. For instance, to mitigate the vulnerability in sliding window scalar multiplication, OpenSSL adopted a new solution, masked-window multiplication, while Libgcrypt regressed to less efficient Double-and-Add-always. Besides, development of GNU Crypto is generally several years behind OpenSSL. 
Comparisons with Other Libraries
Finally we summarize side-channel CVEs in other cryptographic applications (Table 4) , and compare them with OpenSSL and GNU Crypto. Vulnerable Categories. Figure 9a shows the breakdown of vulnerabilities in different categories. We observe that side-channel vulnerabilities exist widely in many applications, in addition to OpenSSL and GNU Crypto. We believe a lot of unrevealed side-channel vulnerabilities still exist in various applications, for two reasons.
First, researchers tend to study common cryptographic libraries, encouraging their developers to continuously improve the code. Other less evaluated applications may still contain out-of-date vulnerabilities, but their developers are unaware or ignorant of them. For instance, Bleichenbacher attack was proposed 20 years ago and has been mitigated in common libraries like OpenSSL and GnuTLS, but it still exists in about one third of top 100 Internet domains including Facebook and PayPal, as well as widely used products from IBM, Cisco and so on [89] .
Second, some attacks such as those against cryptographic primitives or based on micro-architectural contention require the source code to be available, prohibiting researchers from discovering vulnerabilities in closedsource applications. For instance, Figure 9a shows that the majority of vulnerabilities found in closed-source applications are padding oracles via remote timing or message side channels, likely because no source code is needed to experiment with these attacks. We do not know if they also suffer from padding oracle attacks via micro-architectural side channels, as current studies [92, 93, 103, 104] corresponding patches, leaving no vulnerability windows for adversaries to exploit. Regarding the coverage, most discovered vulnerabilities were addressed, with a few exceptions (annotated with in Tables 4a and 4b) where too little public information is available. For these cases, we are unable to ascertain whether these issues were solved or not.
Insights and Lessons
We draw some insights and suggestions based on the summarization and evaluation of side-channel vulnerabilities and countermeasures. We hope they can benefit cryptographic software developers, users and researchers.
Research Directions
First, we propose several promising opportunities and directions for future side-channel research. D1: Identify new vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art cryptographic implementations, more likely in lessstudied ciphers and operations.
The discovery and exploitation of various side-channel vulnerabilities during the past decades inspired people to search for new secure solutions. Now each critical cryptographic primitive has secure algorithms and implementations that are robust against different types of sidechannel attacks. Thus, it is interesting to explore new fundamental vulnerabilities in current implementations. In addition to the cryptographic operations discussed in Sec. 3, researchers can focus on other ciphers and operations, and search for new critical vulnerabilities. For instance, the emerging post-quantum cryptography has drawn people's attention for its resistance against quantum computer based attacks. Different types of post-quantum algorithms were designed for public key infrastructure, e.g., hash-based, lattice-based and multivariate cryptography. Currently researchers only focus on the side-channel vulnerabilities in lattice-based cryptography. It is interesting to explore if there are any chances to attack other types of post-quantum cryptography schemes. D2: Discover outdated vulnerabilities in less popular and closed-source applications.
As discussed in Sec. 5.5, old vulnerabilities, especially those against cryptographic primitives or via microarchitectural contention, can still exist in real-world applications. It is worth the research effort to conduct a more comprehensive evaluation of various side-channel vulnerabilities on different open-source libraries and commercial products. This will raise public awareness on side-channel threats, and more importantly, encourage developers to secure these applications as a result. D3: Design new side-channel attack techniques that can capture finer grained side-channel information, and study countermeasures for the new attacks.
From Sec. 3 we observe that innovation in providing adversaries with more detailed information usually exposes new vulnerabilities. For instance, fixed window modular exponentiation with scatter-gather approach was designed to defeat attacks with the granularity of cache line. However, a new attack method that captures cachebank level information [71] invalidated the approach. Previous countermeasures for padding oracle attacks only considered remote attacks, and thus they focused on producing uniform responses in constant time. Later, hostbased attack techniques were applied to padding oracle settings [92, 93, 103, 104] , compromising such solutions. We hence propose this research direction so the security of cryptographic operations can be constantly enhanced.
Development Recommendations
We offer some suggestions for developers of cryptographic applications and systems to make the implementations more secure and efficient. R1: Different countermeasure strategies can have different vulnerability coverages and performance costs.
Developers need to carefully select the optimal strategies for critical operations.
We summarized different countermeasures and their features in Sec. 4. To remove control flow vulnerabilities, AlwaysExecute strategies introduce performance overhead due to execution of all possible code routines. Condition-alSelect can only defeat remote attacks since it still leaves a minor secret-dependent control flow, while BitwiseSelect is secure against all known types of attacks.
To remove data flow vulnerabilities, AlwaysAccess-BitwiseSelect defeats all known types of attacks with the price of performance degradation from extra memory accesses. On-the-fly calculation is useful if the computation does not contain secret-dependent control flows, while repeated computation causes slowdown.
Cryptographic blinding is a technique dedicated for asymmetric cryptography such as RSA, ElGamal and ECC. It is particularly effective in cases where secretdependent control flow or data flow is hard to remove (e.g., modular multiplication). Plaintext/ciphertext blinding can only defeat chosen-input side-channel attacks, while key blinding does not have this limitation. R2: Software bugs contribute a lot to side-channel vulnerabilities. Developers should verify the code correctness of critical operations prior to release.
Developers may accidentally leave software bugs that can be exploited to perform side-channel attacks. As critical cryptographic operations are designed to be more secure today, adversaries now tend to search such bugs to break the secure designs and implementations (Sec. 5.4). There are three common types of side-channel bugs. First, incorrect flag propagation prevents some cryptographic operations from calling the securely implemented routine even though it is already introduced, exemplified by modular exponentiation [117] and inversion [118] . Second, some secure implementations are only partly applied to the operations or primitives, leaving the rest still vulnerable. For instance, in OpenSSL before version 1.0.2q, most curves (P-224, P-256 and P-521) adopted secure branchless Montgomery ladder or masked window for scalar multiplication, but P-384 curve still used the insecure sliding window implementation, offering the adversary an opportunity to compromise ECDSA [68] . Third, some corner cases were overlooked during implementation, giving rise to non-constant runtime behaviors in execution time [104, 119] , message type [53] and format [91] .
To verify if the secure routines are selected properly and applied to all operations or primitives, developers can insert breakpoints inside the insecure routines and check if they are reached [78] . To verify if the implementation has expected constant behaviors, developers can measure the side-channel information under different cases and check if they are indistinguishable. R3: Developers should carefully handle the reported vulnerabilities. They should (1) prioritize the most severe vulnerabilities; (2) apply patches to all live branches at the same time; (3) apply patches to all vulnerable operations.
From Sec. 5.1 we observe that different types of sidechannel vulnerabilities are assigned with different severity scores. The network-level vulnerabilities are particularly severe as they are more exploitable, so developers should pay special attention to those attacks and prioritize their fixes. Besides, when a vulnerability is disclosed, developers should apply the corresponding countermeasure patches to all live branches of the application immediately. Otherwise, the unpatched branch will remain vulnerable as the threat is disclosed to the public (Sec. 5.3). Developers should also check whether the application contains other implementations sharing the same vulnerability. If so they should also fix them even though they are not reported.
Indications in Practice
We draw some conclusions for cryptographic application users about side-channel threats and countermeasures from a practical viewpoint. I1: Side-channel vulnerabilities are generally considered less severe compared to other vulnerabilities, although their volume in CVE database is non-trivial.
As discussed in Sec. 5.1, two reasons make sidechannel threats less severe: the attacks require higher adversarial capabilities and more domain knowledge, and the damage is relatively smaller. Thus, the existence of these vulnerabilities in applications is by no means a catastrophe to the users and there is no need to panic. The world has not seen an occurrence of malicious sidechannel attacks that could bring severe damages so far. I2: Although side-channel vulnerabilities are regarded as less severe, they are handled very actively, either in mainstream open-source libraries (Sec. 5.2), less popular libraries or closed-source products (Sec. 5.5).
Such active attitude towards side-channel threats is reflected in several aspects. First, new side-channel vulnerabilities were fixed at a very fast speed to reduce users' potential damage. Second, most known side-channel vulnerabilities to date were fixed. Third, cryptographic libraries are now shifting the countermeasures from brand new implementations to minor bug fixes and enhancement, indicating that they are becoming more mature (Sec. 5.4). I3: It is unnecessary for users to always patch or upgrade the libraries for the most secure implementations. They can adopt those suited to their scenarios.
If a use case does not need to consider certain adversarial capabilities, countermeasures designed for them will not be necessary. For instance, if the application does not have network interfaces, then the user does not need to consider network-level side-channels. If the application does not share the computing platform with other untrusted parties, then the user does not need to consider host-level attacks.
Related Work

Physical Attacks
Different from software side-channel attacks, physical side-channel attacks require the adversary to be local to the target system running the victim application to collect the side-channel signals during the application execution. Different attacks have been proposed against cryptographic applications [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [120] [121] [122] . Some of them are so powerful that even the application does not contain secret-dependent control flow or data flow, they are still able to deduce secrets via intermediate values [39] . Systematization of these attacks and vulnerabilities is however not relevant in this paper.
Attacking Non-cryptographic Applications
In addition to recovering keys in cryptographic operations, side-channel attacks can also be used to steal other types of information. At the application level, attacks exist to identify keystrokes [52, [123] [124] [125] [126] [127] [128] [129] , application states and activities [130] [131] [132] , and websites [133, 134] . At the system level, adversaries may use side channels to infer host configurations [135] and memory layout information [136] [137] [138] [139] . Meltdown [140] and Spectre [141] attacks were disclosed to bypass the isolation and protection schemes in operating systems, followed by variants of such attacks [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] [147] . Systematization of these attacks is out of the scope of our work.
Identification of Vulnerabilities
Various approaches and tools were designed to automatically identify potential side-channel vulnerabilities in commodity software. Some static methods utilize abstract interpretation to analyze the source code and measure the information leakage (bounds) [12, 62, [148] [149] [150] [151] [152] [153] , while others verify if a program always exhibits constant-time behavior by checking whether it contains secret-dependent control flow or data flow [14] [15] [16] [17] 19] . Dynamic methods profile program execution and measure the correlation between critical secrets and runtime behaviors from execution traces to capture side-channel vulnerabilities [18, 74, 92, [154] [155] [156] [157] [158] .
Side-channel Surveys
Past efforts summarized side-channel attacks and countermeasures in different contexts including smart card [25] , networked systems [20, 24] , hardware architecture [28, 29] , cloud [26, 27] , smartphone [21, 22, 30] and key logging [23, 31] . They mostly studied side-channel information collecting techniques for specific attack types in specific environments. In contrast, our work focuses on the vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations.
Closer to our work are efforts [159] [160] [161] that studied side-channel vulnerabilities and countermeasures in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC). We distinguish our work from theirs by considering a wider range of cryptographic ciphers and protocols than ECC. We also systematically evaluate the vulnerabilities and countermeasures in different applications in addition to reviewing past literature.
Conclusion
Side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations have been an enduring topic over the past 20 years. Many vulnerabilities have been discovered from previous cryptographic implementations, but unknown ones likely still exist in today's implementations. The good news is that the community resolved these vulnerabilities very actively, and hence large-scale side-channel attacks causing severe real-world damages haven't happened so far.
Besides, years of efforts have fortified common cryptographic libraries and applications against side-channel attacks, and recently discovered vulnerabilities were less significant or surprising.
Looking ahead, we expect continuous arms race between side-channel attacks and defenses. We encourage researchers to discover new vulnerabilities and attacks, evaluate them on a wider range of applications, and develop novel countermeasures for them. number SEQ, header HDR and message m (Equation 3a).
(2) The plaintext P is created by concatenating m, HM , and a padding string pad (Equation 3b) chosen so that the byte length of P is N b, where N is an integer. The most common way is to pad n+1 bytes with each byte value as n, e.g., 0x02||0x02||0x02. (3) P is divided into a sequence of blocks of b bytes, p 1 , p 2 , ..., p N , and encrypted with key K (Equation 3c ). (4) The text T transmitted over the network is the concatenation of HDR and each ciphertext block (Equation 3d). HM = H((K ⊕ opad)||H((K ⊕ ipad)||SEQ||HDR||m)) (3a) P = m||HM ||pad (3b) c i = Enc K (c i−1 ⊕ p i ); i = 1, 2, ..., N (3c) T = HDR||c 1 ||c 2 ||..||c N (3d)
The receiver decrypts T and accepts the message m only if the padding format and MAC are correct.
Implementations of Cryptographic Operations
We show the pseudo code of implementations for different cryptographic operations described in Section 3. Table 5 shows the release history of OpenSSL and GNU Crypto libraries for the past years. We highlight the released versions containing side-channel patches in gray.
Release history of cryptographic libraries
For OpenSSL, we observe that it keeps maintaining about three live branches concurrently throughout the history. The patches of most vulnerabilities were applied to all live branches at the same time. Thus, OpenSSL has good cross-branch patch consistency for side-channel vulnerabilities.
The case of GNU Crypto is more complicated. We ignore GnuTLS as it has too many branches and versions. Libgcrypt was previously a module inside GnuPG for cryptographic primitives, but later detached itself to become an independent library. As a result, some GnuPG
